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Introduction 
The strategies of migrants in obtaining social support  e.g., child care, elderly care, medical 
care, and remittances for relatives in need  are discussed increasingly in migration studies 
(Hondagneu-Sotelo 1999, Mahler and Pessar 2001, Sassen 2000, Yeates 2004). In this con-
tribution, I distinguished between two research perspectives on social support and migration. 
On the one hand are various debates concerning a) mutual support practices of migrants and 
their families in the country of origin and b) mutual support between co-migrants in the coun-
try of destination (Hondagneu-Sotelo and Avila 1997, Salazar Parrenas 2001, Plaza 2000, 
Toro-Morn 1995). On the other hand, care work, as a form of social support provided by mi-
grants, is increasingly taken under consideration in connection with such topics as migration, 
care, and welfare (Anderson 2000, Ehrenreich and Hochschild 2003, Lutz 2002, Ng 2000). 
Thus, both perspectives of the debate touch on the issue of inequality formation on the 
transnational or even global scale. At the same time, they draw attention to different kinds of 
inequality. First, research on support strategies of migrants usually focuses on issues of re-
mittances or non-financial support sent to recipients in the countries of origin (Gosh 2006, de 
Haas and Plug 2006, Orozco 2000). This line of research establishes a connection between 
migrants’ remittances and transformation of social positions of individuals or collectives 
within the country of departure. It emphasizes ambivalent effects of transnational social sup-
port, which sometimes lead to new socioeconomic gaps in the country of origin. The second 
line of research provides evidence for the formation of a new global underclass consisting of 
female care workers who move from countries at the global periphery to countries at the 
global center (Hochschild 2000)1. 
This paper establishes a connection between migration, social support, gender relations, and 
inequality formation by analyzing support strategies of ‘Ukrainian’2 migrants living in Ger-
many. As opposed to the classic perspective on migration and inequality, which assumes 
that migration either transforms social positions in the country of destination or reshapes so-
cioeconomic gaps in the country of origin, I suggest that we consider the multi-location ine-
quality effects of migration. In this regard, I aim to analyze how support strategies produce 
                                               
1
 For a critique on this approach, see Kofman (2004). 
2
 The term ‘Ukrainian’ refers to the citizenship and not to the ethnic belonging of the group of interest. 
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privileged and underprivileged positions on the transnational scale with respect to gender, 
ethnicity, and class. 
Before presenting the empirical case study, I want to refer to the significance of research on 
migrants’ support practices to the research on social inequality. There are two reasons to pay 
special attention to migrants’ support strategies. First, the presented case discloses ways in 
which not only gender relations but also constructions of ‘ethnicity’ and ‘class’ are effective in 
creating unequal positions within transnational space between Germany and the Ukraine. 
Second, it draws attention to the fact that transnational social support is embedded in differ-
ent institutional dimensions in both sending and receiving countries. On one hand, migrants’ 
support strategies are deeply interconnected to the fields of social reproduction in both states 
and, therefore, are determined by different kinds of gender orders. On the other hand, they 
are strongly influenced by migration and welfare regimes in both countries, which effect eth-
nicization and complex class positioning of migrants within transnational settings. In this re-
gard, the central objects of my research refer to a) various gendered forms of social support, 
b) meaning patterns that donors and recipients of social support use with regard to respec-
tive practices3, and c) the relation between social support and migrants’ class mobility. By 
analyzing these different aspects, I take into consideration that social support is determined 
by the specific kind of transnational space within which they occur. This is why the empirical 
study considers d) different institutional regimes in the Ukraine and Germany in which infor-
mal migrants’ practices of social support are embedded. All these issues are analyzed on 
two different levels: first, on the level of everyday practices of migrants and, second, on the 
level of their institutional conditions. 
First of all, the article starts with a description of my empirical study conducted in a ‘German-
Ukrainian’ transnational space (II). Second, I present the theoretical framework guiding my 
empirical research, which is based on concepts of intersectionality and transnational migra-
tion (III). The core part of my article refers to the results of my field work. The analysis of mi-
grants’ support strategies is framed by the intersectionality approach on social inequality (IV, 
V). Additionally, I describe relevant institutional dimensions such as welfare, migration, and 
gender regimes of both countries, the Ukraine and Germany, which frame transnational so-
cial support and provide evidence of their disqualifying practices (VI). The final discussion 
                                               
3
 This way of analyses was established by Marcel Mauss (1954) and his theory of gift circulation. 
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highlights the advantages of a transnational perspective on social support and its complex 
inequality effects (VII). 
The description of the empirical field 
The case study presented does not only raise questions about forms and conditions of sup-
port strategies of ‘Ukrainian’ migrants, it also touches on issues referring to various inequality 
effects of support practices. In this regard, I establish a dynamic connection between gen-
dered orders, migrants’ support strategies, and their class mobility. 
In general, social support practices within the ‘German-Ukrainian’ transnational space can be 
divided into three main categories. First, I analyze strategies of social support directed by 
migrants to their parents or relatives in the Ukraine, such as elderly care, medical care, and 
remittances for retired parents. Second, I explore various forms of social support flowing from 
parents or relatives located in the Ukraine to their migrated adult children living in Germany, 
such as child care (in case migrants have small children), financial support for children’s 
studies, but also non-financial support in form of advice (IV, V). Third, I consider mutual sup-
port of co-migrants living in Germany, which can include child care, elderly care, medical 
care, teaching of Ukrainian or Russian language, or exchange of relevant information (VI). 
The huge socioeconomic gap between the Ukraine and Germany is one of the reasons for 
focusing on transnational space spanning the two European countries. Besides, Germany is 
on top of the Ukrainian popularity scale for emigration countries (Poznjak 2007). However, 
the target regions of labor migration from Ukraine are Russia, Italy, Czech Republic, Poland 
and Portugal . In sum, about 2 to 2.7 million Ukrainian citizens were involved in labor migra-
tion in 2008. That means that migration, and especially labor migration, is perceived as core 
strategy of social mobility (Poznjak 2009). Migration flow from the Ukraine to Germany has 
started around 1991, after the breakdown of the Soviet Union. Economic and political insta-
bility caused the emigration of mainly highly skilled people to countries such as Germany, 
Israel, and USA (Poznjak 2007). In spite of the increasing economic prosperity in the Ukraine 
in 2003/2004, migration flow did not go down, mainly because of the high level of political 
instability, which has emerged since the ‘Orange Revolution’ in 2003. Today, approximately 
128,000 Ukrainian citizens live in Germany. Thus, my study is not necessarily interested in 
the push-and-pull factors of migration from the Ukraine to Germany, but in social linkages 
and social practices based on geographic mobility, which span between the two nation-state 
‘containers.’ 
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The data for my case study were collected in accordance with the multi-sited research 
method (Marcus 1995), which implies that localities in both sending and receiving states 
were selected for the design of a multi-sited research field. First, I chose a locality in the 
country of destination: Bielefeld, a medium-sized city in western Germany . After conducting 
30 semi-structured interviews and 20 participant observations in Bielefeld, I made three addi-
tional interviews with migrants’ relatives, who have spent their vacation with their children in 
Bielefeld. Afterwards I selected four localities in the Ukraine (Ivano-Frankovsk , Rogosin by 
Lviv , Poltava , and Kyiv ), where I conducted five semi-structured interviews with five fami-
lies of migrants living in Bielefeld. Additionally, I carried out five participant observations by 
staying for approximately 12 hours with each family (see appendix). The data interpretation 
was guided by the method of scientific hermeneutics (Amelina 2008, Reichertz 2004), which 
enables one to shed light on meaning patterns guiding social action. 
Access to the respective group of migrants was made possible by the Ukrainian Greek-
Catholic church based in Bielefeld . The contacts to most of my interview partners were es-
tablished at church visits. During these visits, I have learned that the church attendees are a 
very heterogeneous group, which can be characterized by different age levels, martial status, 
socioeconomic, ethnic, and even religious backgrounds. In short, these church attendees 
can be divided into three different ‘generations,’ which are equal to the structure of the 
‘Ukrainian’ population in Germany. The first group consists of 80–90-year-old migrants who 
have stayed in Germany since World War II . The second group of attendees is formed by 
middle-aged male and female migrants who have moved to Germany in the early 1990s. The 
third and final group of attendees consists of a young generation of (mostly) ‘Ukrainian’ mi-
grants, who have entered Germany at the end of the 1990s or after 2000. Moreover, not only 
the ethnic but also the religious backgrounds of church attendees are quite heterogeneous. 
Most visitors are, of course, ethnic Ukrainians with Ukrainian citizenship. But some attendees 
have introduced themselves as ethnic Russians with Ukrainian citizenship or ethnic Russians 
with Russian citizenship. Several attendees describe themselves as ‘ethnic Germans’  with 
German citizenship, who have formerly immigrated to Germany from the Ukraine or from 
other republics of the former Soviet Union. About 50% of the attendees had not belonged to 
the Greek-Catholic denomination before moving to Germany. This part of attendees were 
either Russian-Orthodox, Ukrainian-Orthodox, or Jewish. In general, the ratio of men to 
women was up to 40–60%. 
During participant observations conducted in the Ukrainian church in Bielefeld, I have had 
sufficient opportunities to have conversations with the different ‘generations’ of migrants, but 
the focus of my study was on young migrants (between 20 and 40 years) and middle-aged 
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migrants (between 40 and 60 years), who have immigrated to Germany from the Ukraine at 
the end of the 1990s and after 2000. All of my interview partners (n=30) are legally living in 
Germany, but only about 70% of them have acceptable permission to work. 
Although immigration from the Ukraine to Germany is strongly restricted, my interview part-
ners described several ways of crossing the state borders. Except for ‘ethnic Germans’ and 
political refugees , who have received immigrant visas, most of my interview partners ob-
tained temporary non-immigrant visas and some of them have tried to convert them to immi-
grant visas while they are in Germany. Limited resident authorization of Ukrainian citizens 
are granted in case they a) study in Germany, b) work at German universities, c) work in 
Germany as an Au-pair, c) are married to German citizens, or d) are married to ‘ethnic Ger-
mans’. All these groups rationalized their decisions to migrate in different ways. 
Theoretical framework: intersectionality on transnational scale 
The study of migrants’ support strategies is a good example for ambivalent effects of the 
contradictive class mobility and of the phenomenon of double intersection of gender orders 
with ethnic and class categorizations within the ‘German-Ukrainian’ transnational space. Be-
fore presenting the results of the case study, I make some references to the theoretical 
framework, which is influenced by the intersectionality approach on inequality and by a 
transnational way of thinking. 
In contrast to class-oriented approaches on social inequality, which are based on the socio-
economic income differences of individuals or households, the intersectionality approach 
takes a closer look at the relevance of race, ethnicity, gender, and class to the formation of 
unequal social positions within a nation state frame (Crenshaw 1989, Grusky and Szelényi 
2007, Lieberson 1994, Raj 2002, McCall 2005). It highlights the relevance of social attribu-
tions and categorizations for unequal access to power, resources, and knowledge. As to in-
tersectionality in terms of the discourse theory (Foucault 1972), one can argue that dimen-
sions of inequality are discursively constructed categorizations (regarding class, ethnicity, 
race, and gender), which not only affect distribution and allocation of resources but also ac-
cess to organizations, institutional regimes, and speaker positions in dominant discourses. 
With respect to my case study on support practices of ‘Ukrainian’ migrants living in Germany, 
this would mean that categorizations regarding ethnicity (a specific distinction between ‘ma-
jority’ and ‘minority’), class (the supposed low socioeconomic position of ‘Ukrainian’ migrants 
in the country of origin), and gender categorizations (male migrants regarded as potentially 
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qualified for professional positions and female migrants as mainly qualified for care and do-
mestic work) produced by dominant societal institutions in Germany intersect and influence 
downward class mobility of female migrants and upward class mobility of male migrants . 
Inequality dimensions such as class, ethnicity, race, and gender tend to produce different 
types of social categorization. While ‘class’ creates strata, to which different populations can 
be assigned, ‘ethnicity,’ ‘race,’ and ‘gender’ produce attributions regarding visible traits, 
which are based on the logic of analogies (Swinn 2007). Thus, the formation of social ine-
quality can only be analyzed appropriately if we emphasize the complex interconnection of 
different inequality dimensions and their various logics. With regard to my case study, the 
relevant question refers to conditions that make ethnicization of female migrants and their 
potential downward class mobility more probable than ethnicization of male migrants. 
Thus, there is a challenge to establish a connection between both intersectionality and trans-
national approaches (Faist 2000, Portes 2001, Pries 2008, Vetrovec 1999). In contrast to 
most empirical studies on intersectionality, the transnational perspective does not focus on a 
single nation state frame but on a coherent overlapping of social practices simultaneously 
referring to different nation state frames. The classic perspective on migration and social 
inequality analyzes inequality effects caused by migration either in the country of origin or in 
the country of destination. As opposed to this view, the transnational approach provides evi-
dence for more complex dynamics between migration and inequality. First, the transnational 
approach points out how migration simultaneously contributes to the transformation of ine-
quality orders in the sending and receiving countries. Second, it draws attention to the phe-
nomenon of “contradictory class mobility,” which arises from the migrants’ simultaneous ex-
perience of an increase in financial status due to geographic mobility and the decline in so-
cial position due to their employment as low-skilled workers (Goldring 1998, Parrenas 2001: 
1150). Third, it highlights the emergence of a new transnational scale of inequality formation, 
which can be described as a pluri-locally organized societal frame (Wimmer and Glick 
Schiller 2003, Pries 2008). Thus, the transnational scale functions as a new frame to which 
transnational migrants can reorientate their social positions. 
The present contribution lays emphasis on the latter mentioned issues. First, it establishes a 
connection between transnational class mobility and migrants’ social support. Second, it 
shows how the transnational scale of social inequality emerges. 
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Engendering of social support and migrants’ social mobility 
The case study was guided by the question: How is engendering of transnational social sup-
port interconnected with social mobility of migrants in the country of destination? This ques-
tion implies a description of a complex dynamics of social support, gender narratives, and 
social mobility. First of all, my empirical research provides evidence that social support ren-
dered by families to their migrated adult children directly influences the children’s class mo-
bility within the country of immigration. At the same time, the amount of help is directly inter-
connected with gender narratives. Second, social support provided by migrants to their par-
ents or relatives has to be understood as a form of representation of successful social mobil-
ity. However, the representation of upward mobility absorbs a huge amount of financial and 
temporal resources, which, in return, influence the decrease of actual (often downward) class 
mobility in the country of immigration. However, gender relations influence both representa-
tion forms of success and the amount of resources invested in representation strategies. 
Although I have interviewed migrant families in the Ukraine (n=5) after conducting the study 
in Germany, I have used the gained impressions as an initial point for data interpretation. 
When talking about the reasons for the migration of their adult children, families never high-
light economic motivation as a decisive point. Instead, the original reasons given for migrat-
ing are regarded as being based on different ambitions, such as “self-realization,” “getting a 
new professional experience,” “acquiring new social skills,” and “starting a family/ marriage” 
(Interviews no. 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38). At the point of interview, migrants have al-
ready spent several years in Germany, and in the course of the interview, their families have 
had the chance to compare their earlier expectations with the present situation of their chil-
dren. Independent of initial expectations, the situation of migrated children is primarily inter-
preted with regard to their class mobility. Financial success connected with social mobility is 
decisive for the retrospective sense-making of the decision to migrate. The new professional 
and social experience migrants have gained in Germany is only accepted as valuable or use-
ful if migrants have the possibility to use it to increase their social position either in the coun-
try of destination or in the country of origin. Moreover, migration, which is based on the ambi-
tion to improve the financial situation, is only accepted if class mobility follows. To sum up, 
expectation of upward class mobility functions as a central narrative for the evaluation of mi-
grants’ social mobility. 
However, expectations regarding successful upward mobility are addressed differently 
among men and women. While men primarily have to be professionally successful in the 
country of immigration, women are expected to achieve both professional and private suc-
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cess, which is defined as a “prosperous marriage.” Analyzing complex interconnections of 
social support, gender relations, and social mobility I will highlight support strategies of fe-
male and male migrants and their parents or relatives. First, I take a look at the circulation of 
social support of women up to the age of 40 (ad 1a, 1b). Second, I describe practices of so-
cial support of women older than 40 (ad 1c). Afterward I analyze the circulation of social sup-
port provided by men by distinguishing between men up to 40 (ad 2a) and men older than 40 
(ad 2b). 
(ad 1a) Altogether, I conducted ten interviews with women up to the age of 40 (see Table 1). 
Almost all female interview partners (nine) have finished tertiary education in the Ukraine. Six 
of the ten women got a university degree from a German university or have studied at the 
time of the interview. They have financed their studies by working under illegal conditions. 
Non-graduates were also incorporated in the informal labor market in Germany at some 
stage of their biography. 
Table 1: Brief overview of female interviewees up to the age of 40 (Source: own 
research in Bielefeld 2008/2009) 
 Married female migrants till 40 non-married (single-
mothers) 
 Nr.1 
(1 
child) 
Nr.2 Nr.3 Nr.4 Nr.5 Nr.6 Nr.7 
(1 
child) 
Nr. 8 
(1 
child) 
Nr.9 
(1 
child) 
Nr.10 (2 
children) 
Univ. digree in 
Germany 
sill 
studing 
Still 
studing 
- + + - - + sill 
studied 
- 
Temporarily 
work under 
illegal conditions 
+ + - - + + + + + + 
incorporation in 
the first labour 
market 
Temp. 
training 
Temp. 
training 
- Temp. 
training 
+ + - + - - 
 
The marital status of female migrants up to 40 conditions the kind and amount of social sup-
port distributed by their families. Married women are not financially supported because it is 
assumed that they are adequately taken care of by their husbands. (Regarding single moth-
ers, the opposite is the case.) However, married women can occasionally expect child care 
support from their female relatives, which is organized either by sending children to the 
Ukraine or by inviting female relatives, usually sisters or mothers, to Germany. However, this 
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kind of support does not occur on a regular basis because of the common narrative that mar-
ried female migrants are generally supported by their husbands. At the same time, families 
and female migrants regularly exchange advice by telephone, which generally highlights the 
women’s duty to “protect domestic peace.” (See interviews no. 1, 2 and 6) 
My first conclusion is that the absence of financial and other support during the first years of 
residence reduces the chances of upward mobility for married women (with and without chil-
dren) in the country of immigration. On one hand, they are expected to support their hus-
bands by providing acceptable conditions for his success  i.e., maintain the household and 
take care of mutual children (if they have any). On the other hand, it is anticipated that mar-
ried women have to earn additional income (what they generally do under illegal conditions) 
to finance the nuclear family during the husband’s quest for professional success. To sum 
up, family expectations reduce the chances of married women to get a degree at a German 
university and, consequently, to find jobs that they are qualified to do. 
Another point to be stressed here refers to the observation that families of married female 
migrants are aware of the daughter’s present downward mobility in Germany and her illegal 
employment. On one hand, it is obvious to them that daughters have to take on unskilled 
jobs to secure their living conditions. On the other hand, parents who have visited their chil-
dren in Germany also draw conclusions about their children’s ethnic discrimination. Thus, 
although parents are aware of the difficulties of upward mobility, surprisingly, they still accept 
the social support provided by their daughters. Moreover, it is expected that daughters give 
financial help to retired or ill parents. First, married female migrants regularly or occasionally 
transfer money to supplement the old-age pension of their relatives in the Ukraine. Second, 
they occasionally take care of their own parents and relatives in the Ukraine. If they are not 
able to look after their relatives themselves, they send money intended for this task. But the 
latter practice is less popular. Third, they send money to buy medical supplies. 
This observation raises two questions. First, why do parents accept the social support, 
though they are aware of their daughters’ situation? And, second, why do women give social 
support continuously? Both questions can be answered with reference to the idea that class 
mobility is always embedded in a symbolic dimension: transformation of class mobility is, 
therefore, strongly interconnected with strategies of symbolic representation of upward or 
downward mobility. In this case study, however, the representation strategies are directed to 
the audience in the country of origin and aim at displaying upward mobility by the actual 
downward mobility of female migrants. The background of these strategies is rooted in the 
contradictive class mobility of migrants (Goldring 1998, Parrenas 2001). On one hand, from 
the perspective of the country of origin, the financial situation of female migrants improves. 
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On the other hand, their social position decreases because of incorporation in the second 
labor market. Consequently, strategies of representation of success, which address migrants’ 
families, aim at an up-valuation of social position of migrants in the country of origin. Thus, 
these strategies are obviously rooted in the success narrative, which seems to be effective 
for all actors in the transnational field between Germany and the Ukraine. 
Consequently, my second conclusion stress that the acceptance of social support by parents 
is rooted in the symbolic representation. I argue that parents, who are relatively well situated 
and only exaptionally need support, accept their daughter’s help because they have to le-
gitimize the absence of their children to neighbors and close relatives. They have to show to 
their social environment a) their daughter’s success and b) the fact that their daughter has 
not really left them, although she has moved away. This means that their acceptance of sup-
port refers not only to the representation of the daughter’s upward mobility but also to the 
continuing existence of their family. 
At the same time, married women also have to represent their imaginary success to their 
parents. Although most of them have unskilled jobs (also those women who have studied at 
a university) and have to live off minimum wage, they continuously provide support. Thus, 
why do married women provide social support though they are in need of it themselves? Just 
like their parents, they are victims of the narrative of successful upward mobility due to mi-
gration. They have to provide evidence that their geographic mobility is accompanied by suc-
cessful class mobility. This is why they continuously provide social support. At the same time, 
maintenance of financial and care support for relatives is perceived, from the female and 
male perspectives, as “something absolutely natural,” a “typical female activity”. Utterances 
such as “We are raised as caregivers and supporters” and “it is part of female nature to give 
help and to take care of people close to you” are common statements (excerpts from inter-
view no. 1 and no.7). Apart from financial support and care activities, women also provide 
new clothing for relatives or take care of parents’ households during their visits home. By 
providing support, married female migrants take on the position of a donor. (“As long as I can 
support them, I’m fine. At least, I can still afford that.” [excerpts from interview no. 7]) From 
this perspective, continuous provision of support increases their social position in comparison 
with the position of their families at home . Additionally, the pressure to provide support im-
midiatly leads to the decision to take on unskilled jobs and to work under illegal conditions. 
This enables female migrants to provide support earlier. The other side of the coin is that this 
decision automatically progresses their downward mobility in Germany. 
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(ad 1b) The circulation of social support between families and their daughters who are single 
mothers is organized in the opposite way. Most single mothers can count on different kinds 
of social support flowing from the Ukraine to Germany. There is, first of all, financial support 
supplied for child care and child equipment (this also includes car ownership). Apart from 
that, female relatives provide child care on a regular basis: they take care of their grandchil-
dren living in Germany, regularly coming to Germany for several weeks; or, if they are em-
ployed, their grandchildren are sent to the Ukraine. In addition, they frequently pay for nurs-
ing and education facilities of their grandchildren in Germany. The narrative behind this prac-
tice refers to the necessity to provide social support to single mothers because they do not 
have a husband to provide for them. Consequently, the class mobility of single mothers (in 
two of three cases) is more successful than that of married female migrants (see Table 1). 
First of all, single mothers are not obliged to support their husband. Second, they are not 
expected to provide social support to their parents because of their assumed indigence. 
Third, due to appropriate support by their family, they are able to study and be incorporated 
within the first labor market sooner than their married counterparts (two of three single moth-
ers have studied in Germany). Although single mothers are better incorporated and have 
better chances for upward class mobility, they perceive their situation as not satisfying be-
cause they are not successful in “preserving their family.” Besides, they are in the position of 
a recipient of support services. This is why, from their family’s point of view, their position is 
interpreted as downward mobility in Germany. At the same time, single mothers aim to be 
able to return support in the future: if they are able to become German citizens, they would 
work for the naturalization of their parents (see interviews 8 and 9). 
(ad 1c) As opposed to young female migrants, women older than 40 have fewer possibilities 
to be incorporated in the first labor market in Germany. I have conducted six interviews with 
women older than 40 (see Table 2). 
Table 2: Brief overview of female interviewees above 40 (Source: own research 
Bielefeld, 2008/2009) 
 Married Non-married  
 No.11 
(2 adult 
children, 1 
grandchild 
living in 
Germany 
No. 12 
(2 adult children 
and 2 grandchil-
dren living in 
Germany) 
No. 13 
(1 adult 
child) 
 
No.14 
(1 adult 
child) 
 
No. 15 
 
No.16 
(2 adult chil-
dren living in 
Ukraine) 
 
Univ. degree 
in Germany 
not recog-
nized 
- - not rec-
ognized 
not rec-
ognized 
- 
Temporarily 
working 
under 
+ - + + + + 
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illegal condi-
tions 
incorporation 
in the first 
labor market 
- - - 
 
-  
integra-
tion 
course, 
advanced 
training 
 
- 
integration 
course, 
assistance 
in the 
ethnic 
church 
- 
 
 
All interview partners have completed tertiary education in the former Soviet Union. Two 
women have tried to get their Soviet degree recognized, but failed. A few months after mov-
ing to Germany, all of them were in the labor market under illegal conditions. They continu-
ously try to improve their social position by attending integration courses or completing ad-
vanced training. I assume that circulation of social support between this category of female 
migrants and their relatives (parents, siblings, and children) in the Ukraine is also guided by a 
similar narrative of assumed successful mobility. Although they are positioned at the bottom 
of the German class hierarchy, female migrants have obligations, independent of their marital 
status, to support their relatives in the Ukraine. This support includes, apart from child care 
(daughter’s or son’s children), also elderly care. Both married and unmarried women occa-
sionally provide money transfers to finance the old-age pension or medical supplies of their 
relatives in the Ukraine. They also frequently travel to the Ukraine in order to care for their 
parents or relatives. Furthermore, they also care for terminally ill relatives and organize their 
funerals. In sum, they define all of the aforementioned practices as genuine female activities. 
Providing social support enables female migrants to be regarded as donors and help provid-
ers; consequently, this subjectively increases their social position. (Aside from this, the ne-
cessity of support is also discussed with co-migrants.) At the same time, their investments in 
social support simultaneously decrease their social position in Germany. On one hand, they 
tend to accept unskilled jobs sooner because these jobs promise immediate income. On the 
other hand, they do not invest the same money and time to their incorporation within the first 
labor market in the country of destination. 
(ad 2a) Describing the circulation of social support between male migrants and their families, 
I start with the analysis of practices of men up to age 40 (10 persons, see Table 3). Eight of 
the 10 interviewees have finished their academic studies in the Ukraine before moving to 
Germany. More than half of my male interview partners (six) have received a degree from a 
German university or are studying at the time of the interview . Three interview partners want 
to study in Germany, but their high school degree is not accepted by German institutions; 
therefore, instead of studying, they have started to work (under legal conditions). Both cate-
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gories of men (with and without a German university degree) are successfully incorporated 
within the first labor market at the time of the interview. 
Table 3: Brief overview of male interviewees up to the age of 40 (Source: own research 
in Bielefeld 2008/2009) 
 Married male migrants  non-married male 
migrants 
 No.17 
(1 
child) 
No.18 
(German 
PhD) 
 
No.19 
(2 chil-
dren) 
(Canadian 
PhD) 
No.20 
(1 
child) 
No.21 
 
No.22 
 
No.23 
(1 
child) 
 
No.24 No. 25 
(German 
PhD) 
No.26 
Univ. degree 
in Germany 
+ + canadian 
univ. 
degree 
+ + not 
reco-
gnized  
not 
reco-
gnized 
not 
reco-
gnized 
+ sill 
studying 
Temporarily 
working 
under 
illegal condi-
tions 
+ - - + + - - + - - 
incorporation 
in the first 
labor market 
+ + + + + + - + + + 
 
Just like those of female migrants, male migrants’ migration decisions are also framed by the 
narrative of upward class mobility due to migration. The parents’ expectations regarding their 
son’s success refers to their future duty as the family’s “breadwinner.” This narrative is based 
on the assumption of the ‘Ukrainian’ middle class that only professionally successful men are 
able to found their own family and to support their parents. This is why a son’s incorporation 
into Germany’s first labor market is a common ambition of parents and sons. 
The family’s expectations regarding upward mobility of male migrants do not differ with re-
spect to their marital status. Sons are generally anticipated to successfully finish their univer-
sity studies and to find a qualified, well-paid job in Germany or another European country. 
Male migrants rarely receive financial support from their relatives (only in two cases) be-
cause, as male adults, they are expected to make a living on their own. (This expectation is 
also connected to the notion that self-financing is easier in Germany than in the Ukraine.) 
Students are expected to finance their studies by themselves, but they are not expected to 
start with support provision during the studies. Male migrants who intend to study but who 
cannot get their degrees recognized, start to transfer support to their parents immediately 
after their move to Germany (three cases). Both categories of male migrants (with and with-
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out German university degree) regularly receive advice concerning appropriate ways of pro-
fessional success in Germany. Students are pushed to continue their studies and find ways 
to handle difficult situations4. My first conclusion in this regard is that parents’ expectations 
noticeably shape the upward class mobility of male migrants. Additionally, male migrants are 
supported (mostly non-financially) by their wives. This implies that male migrants are per-
ceived from both groups of actors, parents and wives, as pioneers of successful incorpora-
tion within the first labor market, an expectation that positively influences their social rise. 
Another point to be mentioned here refers to a significant difference in support provision from 
male migrants, depending on whether they hold a German university degree. Migrants with-
out a German university degree start to provide social support to their parents immediately 
after their resettlement to Germany. In contrast, migrants with a German university degree 
first start to transfer support after they have completed their studies. But the amount of finan-
cial help and the frequency of non-financial support are lower compared with those of non-
graduates. This observation can also be explained with reference to the idea of status repre-
sentation, which is connected to the phenomenon of the contradictive social mobility, which 
is expressed in larger financial income of a migrant from the point of view of the country of 
origin but low social position in the country of immigration. It implies that migrants who actu-
ally reach a higher class position in Germany (manager in big companies, scientists at Ger-
man universities) are not under pressure to display their success. This is why, they can con-
tinue to invest time and finances in the continuous improvement of their social position in the 
country of immigration. Meanwhile, men without a university degree provide more financial 
and non-financial support to display the success they claim to have ‘achieved’ in Germany. 
However, investment of financial and temporal resources in parents’ support does not reduce 
their chances of being incorporated into the first labor market because they receive additional 
support from their wives. Nevertheless, it reduces their chances of continuous upward mobil-
ity in Germany, which requires additional financial and temporal investments. Therefore, my 
second conclusion hints at the connection between amounts of social support, contradictive 
social mobility within a transnational a context, and strategies of representation: the higher 
class position in the immigration country, the lower the amount of support provided to rela-
tives in the country of emigration. 
                                               
4
 Parents of male migrants who have children do not additionally provide child care because it is anticipated that 
such duties are fulfilled by the wives of their sons. 
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Despite the aforementioned difference, almost all male migrants provide different kinds of 
social support to their relatives. First, they provide regular or occasional money transfers to 
finance the old-age pension of their relatives. They also take care of the medical and nursing 
needs of their relatives in the Ukraine. But, in contrast to female co-migrants, they do not 
provide care themselves. Young men define support of their parents and relatives as an act 
to compensate for their physical absence: “I need to be sure that the situation at home is 
good enough and that my parents are adequately supplied.” (Interview no. 17) The small 
amount of money given to parents and relatives raise the possibility realizing some additional 
wishes they would not be able to fulfill without this help. It can be the possibility to buy some 
new clothing, to cultivate hobbies, or to improve their living situation. During the home visits, 
young men do ‘male’ duty such as construction work. But it is not only the physical absence 
that needs to be compensated for. There is also the absence of a future patriarch, who is 
responsible for the decision-making process within the family. Thus, the acceptance of social 
support on the part of the parents fulfills, apart from its practical advantage, the representa-
tion of their son’s upward mobility in Germany. 
(ad 2b) Independent of their marital status, men above 40 have fewer obligations to support 
their relatives in the Ukraine than their female counterparts. Men older than 40 have difficul-
ties in getting their Soviet degrees recognized (see Table 4). Consequently, they are only 
temporarily incorporated into the first labor market. Primarily, they are included in the second 
labor market. 
Their financial transfers to the Ukraine are rather occasional. They also do not engage in 
elderly care or in the organization of funerals in the country of departure. One of the reasons 
can be the difficulty to represent a genuine ‘male’ support activity at this age, besides money 
transfer. It is not expected that men engage in care. Another reason could refer to the as-
sumption that the center of the family is based on the location where the ‘patriarch’ is (in this 
case, in Germany). While young men at least theoretically imagine the possibility of a per-
manent return to the Ukraine, co-migrants above 40 are confident of their decision to spend 
the rest of their lives in Germany. Thus, there is no need to display (an imaginary) success 
corresponding to the geographic mobility in the social environment in the country of origin.  
Although this group provides less support to relatives in the country of origin, the men still 
cannot use their financial and non-financial resources to improve their social position. Their 
discontinuous biography connected to devaluation of Ukrainian degrees influences possibili-
ties of advanced professional training and thus contributes to the unavoidable downward 
mobility of this group. As a result, male migrants tend to transfer their own expectations re-
garding social mobility to their adult children. A successful incorporation of adult children 
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within the first labor market is a central narrative of the legitimization of their migration deci-
sion. 
Table 4: Brief description of male interview partners above 40 (Source: own research 
in Bielefeld 2008/2009) 
 Married male migrants Non-Married male 
migrants 
 No.27 
(1 adult child, 
living in Ger-
many) 
No.28 
(2 adult children 
and 2 grandchil-
dren, living in 
Germany) 
 
No.29 
(2 adult children 
and 2 grandchil-
dren, living in Ger-
many) 
Nr. 30 
(1 adult child and 1 
grandchild lining in 
the Ukraine) 
Univ. degree 
in Germany 
not recog-
nized 
 
not recognized 
 
not recognized 
 
not recognized 
 
Temporarily 
working 
under 
illegal condi-
tions 
+ + - + 
incorporation 
in the first 
labor market 
temporarily - - - 
Gendered paths of migrants’ reciprocal support  
Up to this point I have described the central dynamics of social support between migrants 
and their relatives in the Ukraine. But I have not provided evidence for the mutual support of 
co-migrants. In a word, one can distinguish between seven support strategies practiced by 
co-migrants (see Table 5): 
 
Table 5: Forms of mutual social support provided by ‘Ukrainian’ co-migrants (Source: 
own research 2008/2009) 
Forms of social support  Gender specificity 
Provision of employment possibilities in 
the first and  second labor market 
Practiced by both genders 
Money lending to co-migrants Practiced by both genders 
Exchange of relevant information con-
cerning visa requirements, welfare regu-
lations, and tax systems 
Practiced by both genders 
Exchange of relevant information about 
the education system 
Practiced by female migrants 
Teaching Ukrainian and Russian lan- Practiced by female migrants 
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guage to children 
Care support in cases of illness Practiced by female migrants 
Mutual childcare Practiced by female migrants 
 
In this section I point out the significance and conditions of the first (provision of employment 
possibilities) and the last mentioned (childcare) strategies of mutual support. 
The provision of employment possibilities is the most powerful strategy practiced by co-
migrants in the country of destination. The first impression I gained during my research led to 
the conclusion that this strategy is effective independent of gender. Later in the process of 
data interpretation I realized that women usually provide jobs to other women. However, 
these jobs, as a rule, are located on the second labor market. Men provide jobs to other men, 
whereas these jobs are located on the first labor market. The gendered distribution of em-
ployment possibilities – this is my conclusion – is one of the conditions which reproduce un-
equal access to the first labor market. Most men I interviewed are included in the first labor 
market. In this regard the interesting question refers to the symbolic background which de-
fines boundaries of gender as decisive for an access to different labor markets. Or, to put it in 
other words: why do men not provide positions on the first labor market to their female co-
migrants? 
The first reason refers to the ‘Ukrainian’ gender order (see Section VI), which postulates that 
upward mobility of women is less desirable as of men. Although women are expected to be 
engaged professionally, their upward mobility is not necessarily expected. The second rea-
son refers to the fact that there are institutional limits, defined by the German nation state, 
which affect the recognition of Ukrainian university degrees. The difficulty of this procedure 
conditions the fact that fewer women (but also fewer migrants above 40) have their Ukrainian 
degrees recognized. This fact decreases the potential possibilities of women to be included 
in the first labor market. Thus, there are few female candidates which could be recom-
mended for professional jobs on the first labor market by female co-migrants. 
I have to stress that male and female migrants apply different meaning patterns to the strat-
egy of job provision. While for males the provision of job possibilities is associated with com-
petition, for females it is a possibility to overcome the outside-categorizations, which define 
females as passive and discriminated subjects. Two excerpts of interviews with one male (1) 
and one female (2) interviewee illustrate these differences: 
(1) “Yes, mutual help is regularly provided. We also help each other with finding new jobs. 
When I left a post office, where I worked as a delivery boy, I passed the position on to my 
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acquaintance (V). Now, while I am applying for jobs, it is not natural that my friend helps me. 
We all have similar skills [economist with focus on Eastern European countries – A.A.]. It is 
obvious that we are competitors. But despite of that we are friends and we come to an ar-
rangement.” (Interview no. 17) 
 (2) “You know, last time I managed to find a legal job for my friend (V) How do I feel when I 
find a job for her? I feel proud. I am a no-bo-dy in Germany. Despite of that I am able to es-
tablish contactsV and to find well paid positions for my friends. That means I am able to 
overcome difficulties, even living abroad” (Interview no. 7)   
To conclude, job provision on the basis of ethnic networks is offered in a very selective way: 
gender orders and competition for the successful admission to the first labor market define 
the degree and the willingness of support. 
The other strategy, which has to be described in this report, refers to the social conditions 
and symbolic background of mutual childcare. On the one hand, I have observed that moth-
ers take turns with taking care for children without expecting financial rewards. On the other, 
Ukrainian women provide childcare in exchange for small financial compensation. This sup-
port strategy is embedded in two different frames. On the one hand, the ‘Ukrainian’ gender 
order presupposes that women have to combine both, professional work and child upbring-
ing, without necessarily increasing their status. Therefore, my female interviewees with chil-
dren continued their employment within the second labor market after child birth . This self-
expectation of being employed explains why they need continuous childcare. On the other 
hand, the ‘German’ gender order my interviewees have been confronted with postulates that 
women have to take care of their children at home until they are 3 years old. This order is 
established in German daycare regulations, which restricts the age of children who can at-
tend kindergarten to three years. To sum up, the expectations of female migrants contradict 
the institutional requirements concerning daycare facilities. However, female migrants refuse 
to adopt the new gender order. They rearrange the situation by using the care services of 
their female co-migrants.  
The description of the first strategy provides evidence that migrants’ practices of social sup-
port, which are based on focused and generalized reciprocity, are highly selective in regard 
to gender categories. Consequently, this selectivity promotes declassing of female migrants. 
At the same time, I neglect to describe female migrants as actors without agency. Currently 
the female strategy of mutual childcare hints at ways in which women try to reverse situa-
tions of underprivileged positioning. 
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Institutional categorizations as a source of inequality effects: German 
and Ukrainian institutional frames 
The sections IV and V provide evidence for how contradictive social mobility and strategies 
of symbolic representation of an increased status influence dynamics, amount, and gendered 
interpretations of social support. They also explore the discursive structure of a narrative 
which consolidates notions of  geographic and social mobility with gender attributions, and 
point out ways in which this narrative influences the interpretation of upward and downward 
class mobility of migrants within the ‘German’-‘Ukrainian’ transnational space. However, this 
section assesses the significance of various institutional dimensions which frame social sup-
port in the German-Ukrainian transnational space. 
This analysis is based on the intersectionality approach which highlights ways in which social 
categorizations referring to gender, ethnicity, and class are produced by different institutional 
regimes. Consequently, it focuses on practices of categorization which influence mobiles’ 
access to formal and informal institutions. Thus, the transnational turn demands to consider 
ways in which institutional regimes located in different nation states overlap. The overlapping 
of ‘Ukrainian’ and ‘German’ institutional dimensions, such as migration regime, welfare regu-
lations, education systems, and gender orders, condition migrants’ biographical life-course 
and strategies of geographical and social mobility. In this regard, my analysis refers to two 
central issues. The first issue concerns ways in which categorizations regarding ethnicity, 
gender, and class are produced by institutional regimes in different nation state frames . The 
second issue sheds light on situations or frames in which these effects overlap and generate 
cumulative effects. My analysis focuses, therefore, on institutional dimensions framing mi-
grants’ strategies social support in both countries (see Table 6). 
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Table 6: Relevant institutional places framing transnational social support in German-
Ukrainian transnational space (Source: own research 2008/2009) 
Germany Ukraine 
Immigration regime: 
Integration regulations: in-
tegration courses 
Emigration regime: 
‘diasporic’ politics 
Welfare regime Welfare regime 
Gender order Gender order 
Education system:  regula-
tions concerning the recog-
nition of foreign degrees          
Education system 
 
Referring to the first issue I start with a description of inequality effects produced by institu-
tional regimes in Germany. In this regard I especially take those institutional conditions into 
consideration which frame migrants’ strategies of social support, such as 1) immigration re-
gime, 2) welfare regulations, 3) regulations concerning the assessment of foreign educational 
qualifications, 4) integration requirements, and 5) gender order. 
(ad 1) The German immigration regime is a central frame for production of various inequality 
effects, because it decisively determines migrants’ access to the first labor market. Addition-
ally, it is strongly interconnected with welfare and gender orders. As mentioned above, my 
interview partners fall into four categories: a) migrants married to German citizens , b) stu-
dents and c) non-graduates who are not married to German citizens, and d) political refugees 
(the so-called “Kontingentflüchtlinge”) who were moved to Germany because of their Jewish 
denomination. These groups get different kinds of residence permits, which are linked to dif-
ferent kinds of work permits. The first groups, migrants married to a German citizen, gain 
temporary residence permits (which can be converted to permanent residence permits after 
residency of 3 years) and unrestricted work permits. The second group, students, gets tem-
porary residence permits, which are connected to restricted work permits (approx. 18 hours 
per week). After their studies graduates can stay in Germany under the condition that a) they 
find employment for which no other German citizen can be found and b) that this job com-
plies with their educational background. The third group, migrants without academic back-
ground in Germany, does not receive work permits during the first three years of residency in 
Germany. This disadvantage especially affects wives of graduated migrants and migrants, 
who are older than 40. The fourth group, political refugees (“Kontingentflüchtlinge”), auto-
matically receives unrestricted immigration visas and work permits.  
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To sum up, Ukrainian migrants can receive a permanent immigration visa after 5 years of 
residency in Germany, whereby one year of studies counts as a half a year of residency . 
German citizenship can be accessed after 8 years of residency. Both, permanent residence 
permits and German citizenship are accessible on condition of successful continuous em-
ployment in the first labor market. An additional requirement is a minimum of a 60-month 
payment of pension and unemployment insurance. The plural citizenship is accepted only in 
exceptional cases. 
To conclude, the lack of work permits as well as restricted work permits granted to migrants, 
who are not married to German citizens, condition illegal employment during first years of 
their residency. In my case study students and their wives (rarely: husbands) are employed 
illegally. Migrants older than forty are also incorporated within the second labor market. The 
main inequality effect of these regulations consists in declassing Ukrainians who are not mar-
ried to German citizens. Thus, the necessity of incorporation within the informal labor market, 
caused by migration requirements, influences additional categorizations of migrants: firstly, 
they have to ethnicize themselves in order to get entry to the unskilled sector:  
“When I entered Germany I realized that as a student I cannot earn enough money legally. 
Then, together with my friend, I walk from door to door to look for a work and very quickly I 
discovered a job at a farm (V). I didn’t have to explain to the farmer who I am. He was famil-
iar with the system.” (Interview no. 20) 
And, secondly, they are pushed to make gendered categorizations in order to access specific 
positions within the informal labor market. Female migrants, who are engaged in care and 
domestic work, describe their jobs as genuine female activity: 
“My employer knows that Ukrainian women are more willing to help than other. Why? Capi-
talistic people cannot understand this point. How was it at home? ‘The communist party 
comes first, than your’. ‘Be willing to give’ – we have learned this statement by heart. It is 
easy for us to give. We do it, uncomplicated and quickly. Those who grow up under commu-
nist conditions have learned to share, to help, and to give.” (Interview no. 7) 
(ad 2) The access to the German welfare regime is closely connected to different types of 
residence permits. Immigration law defines two categories of non-EU citizens with access to 
welfare benefits. There is, first of all, a certain type of political refugee (“Kontingentflücht-
ling”), who has unlimited access to social benefits. Secondly, migrants who are married to a 
German citizen have access to child and social benefits, pension and unemployed benefits, if 
he or she paid unemployment insurance. Thus, Ukrainians (students, their wives and mi-
grants older than 40), who are not married to German citizens do not have access to the 
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above mentioned benefits during their first years of residency in Germany. An exception is 
only the compulsory health insurance. Migrants who are not married to German citizens can 
receive unemployment and social benefits only after the transformation of a restricted visa to 
a permanent residence permit (after 5 years of residency). On the one hand, this regulation 
conditions the necessity of mutual support of co-migrants (see section V). On the other hand, 
it determines a continuous engagement in illegal care and domestic work which enables mi-
grants to earn additional income for non-budgetary costs. To conclude, restricted access to 
welfare benefits additionally declasses parts of Ukrainian migrants.  
(ad 3) The next and important mechanism of declassing is rooted in the devaluation of 
Ukrainian university degrees by German authorities. In sum, there are three institutional posi-
tions responsible for the assessment of foreign educational qualifications: a) universities, b) 
The Central Office of Foreign Education which is responsible for the implementation of rec-
ognition criteria on the federal level, and c) bureaus for the assessment of foreign qualifica-
tions in selected professional fields (for instance in the field of medicine) . The inequality ef-
fects of recognition procedures vary depending on the groups of migrants (students, their 
wives, and migrants older than 40). But generally the procedure implicates a) an ethniciza-
tion of the corresponding people and, as a consequence, b) their declassing, because it lim-
its migrants’ access to the first labor market. Generally Ukrainian school degrees and univer-
sity degrees are defined as not equal to German degrees . This is justified as well as by 
length of schooling or university studies, as well as their content. Thus, Ukrainian school de-
grees are obtained after 10 (actually11) years, German degrees - after 13 years (in some 
federal states 12 years). The former socialist orientation of the Ukrainian education system 
and high number of private universities in the present Ukraine, whose degrees can be ob-
tained by illegal money transfers, are additional reasons for the unequal classification of 
Ukrainian education (see interview no. 41). 
As mentioned above, apart from few exceptions most people from my case study have re-
ceived university education in the Ukraine (or other states of the former Soviet Union). But in 
most cases the procedure of degree recognition tends to devaluate their university and 
school degrees. Usually Ukrainian university degrees are classified as equal to the German 
university entrance diploma (“Abitur”). This is why students who study in Germany the same 
subjects as they had in the Ukraine usually have to repeat the whole course of studies . Mi-
grants, who are the wife or husband of students and other, who are married to German citi-
zens, have fewer possibilities to be incorporated within the first labor market, because of the 
impossibility to have their university degrees recognized as equal to German university de-
grees. They either have to repeat their education in Germany or (depending on their work 
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permit) find employment in the informal labor market. Migrants, who are older than forty, ex-
perience similar problems in regard to university degree recognition. After they realize that a 
degree recognition will fail they start working (depending on their work permit) under illegal or 
legal conditions. Earning a new degree is one of the last options this group would take into 
consideration (see interview No.15, 30). 
(ad 4) While recognition procedures support ethnicization and, in consequence, the declass-
ing of migrants, integration courses, which the German government defines as new instru-
ments of integration, generate additional ethnicization effects. Since 2005 migrants, who did 
not finish an academic study at German university, have to participate in integration courses, 
which have duration of one year and comprise more than 600 hours. University graduates 
participate on the 45-ours “orientation course”, which explicitly defines expectations on new-
comers. First, visiting the course creates the self-perception as a ‘foreigner’ and separates 
the ‘majority society’ from ‘minorities’: 
“To me it was very important to visit this course. Today’s lesson has referred to the German 
welfare system. We were told that most Eastern-European immigrants become a burden of 
the German welfare system (V). I see this point, but I was never going to be that. You know 
me, I can take care of myself (V)” (Interview no. 3) 
Additionally integration courses generate engendering of migration by providing pictures of 
acceptable and not acceptable images of male and female migrants (Interview no. 3). 
(ad 5) In recent years the ‘German’ gender regime  has been under transformation. Only 
some years ago the ‘German’ gender order dictated that women, not men or state facilities, 
are generally responsible for the upbringing of children. One of the expectations assumed 
that the woman has to take care of her child until it is 3 years old, only then she could return 
to her professional life. Consequently, only 3-year old children could attend kindergarten. 
This limitation is one reason for the increase of au pair migration from the Ukraine (but also 
other Eastern European countries) to Germany . However, after reforms of child-raising 
benefit and a decrease of the age for entering kindergarten to one year in 2007, the expecta-
tions towards female employees have been under transformation. The ‘conservative’ gender 
regime and its transformation have two consequences in respect to my female interview 
partners. Firstly, they are confronted with new images of women and new understandings of 
what it means “to be a good mother”. And secondly, migrant women with children still have 
few possibilities to find daycare until their children reach the age of three. On the one hand, 
the difficulty to access child care facilities encourages mutual support of female co-migrants 
and, additionally, support of female migrants with children by their female relatives living in 
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the Ukraine. On the other hand, this implies the impossibility of a successful incorporation 
within the first labor market, which requires reliable engagement. In this regard the incorpora-
tion in the “more flexible” informal labor market seems to be a better option to manage family 
and job (see interviews no.1, 2, 9, 10). Therefore, institutional limitations, which are based on 
specific gender narratives, have a negative effect on female migrants by additionally limiting 
the access to the first labor market. These limitations increase a possibility of declassing. 
The overview about institutional frames of migrants’ support strategies in Germany shows 
that different inequality effects are interconnected. Social categorizations regarding ethnicity, 
gender, and class are not effective on their own, but only in combination with each other. 
Additionally the overview points out how these different categorizations restrict migrants’ ac-
cess to institutions and organizations. On the one hand, we can see in which ways ethniciza-
tion, engendering, and declassing constrains the access to the German welfare system and 
to the first labor market. On the other hand, we observe that the self-ethnicization and en-
gendering of Ukrainian migrants enable them to access ‘ethnic’ networks, communities, and 
(gendered) possibilities of social support (see IV, V). The overview of inequality effects in 
respect to the Ukrainian population is concisely summarized in the following table 7. 
Table 7: Social categorizations produced by German institutions and their inequality 
effects in respect to the group of ‘Ukrainian’ migrants (Source: own research 
2008/2009) 
Institutional frames of Ger-
many 
Inequality effects Effects on migrants’ 
strategies 
Immigration regime: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Integration regulations: inte-
gration courses 
Ethnicization, declassing 
and engendering 
 
 
 
 
 
Ethnicization and engen-
dering 
Inclusion within the sec-
ond labor market, mar-
riage as a strategy 
against declassing (be-
cause of a special type of 
residence permit) 
 
Positive self-ethnicization 
(the significance of the 
role of ethnic church), 
merging of gender im-
ages and ethnic belong-
ing 
Welfare regime Declassing Different forms of social 
support of co-migrants 
 
Gender order Engendering and de-
classing 
Additional engendering 
of childcare promotes the 
inclusion of female mi-
grants within the second 
labor market; childcare 
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support strategy of fe-
male co-migrants 
 Education system:  regula-
tions concerning the recogni-
tion of foreign degrees                 
Ethnicization and de-
classing 
Limitations of incorpora-
tion within the first labor 
market, promotion of an 
incorporation within the 
second labor market, 
especially female mi-
grants and migrants 
older than 40 are af-
fected by these effects 
  
 
My analysis intends to highlight possible overlappings of different institutional frames in Ger-
many and the Ukraine in order to disclose a possible intensification of inequality effects. Be-
fore I provide evidence for this topic, I will refer to institutional frames of the Ukrainian state. 
However, my analysis explores only such dimensions which influence additional inequality 
effects within the transnational space between Germany and the Ukraine. In this regard I 
describe 1) the emigration politics of the Ukrainian state. Additionally, I touch issues such as 
2) the current revival of ethnicization politics in the new Ukraine and 3) the current status of 
its welfare regime. Furthermore, 4) I refer to the transformation of gender orders within to-
day’s Ukraine. 
(ad 1) The emigration politics of the Ukrainian government can, on the one hand, be divided 
into strategies supporting a return of labor migration and, on the other, in strategies aiming at 
the development of an ‘Ukrainian diaspora’ abroad. The first type of policy is only a future 
option proposed by migration experts (Poznjak 2009). First, the government intends to create 
return programs which support the establishment of small businesses in which former 
migrants can be employed. Secondly, returning migrants can benefit from further qualification 
courses, which can enable them to be competitive at the first labor market. However, diaspo-
ra politics are more dominant at present time. These politics include, firstly, efforts concer-
ning the legalization of Ukrainian migrants who live abroad illegally. These politics intend to 
create consultation possibilities at Ukrainian embassies, which should inform migrants about 
their rights and responsibilities in the country of destination. Secondly, immigration politics 
intend to improve social security of Ukrainian immigrants. In this regard several multi-lateral 
and bi-lateral agreements between the Ukraine and the target countries of labor migration 
have been approved during the last 15 years .  
To sum up, Ukrainian immigration politics recognize the fact that labor migrants prefer to 
continue their employment abroad. Dealing with such migrants in the same way as with 
members of “diasporas” is a self-evident strategy for the Ukrainian government. The symbo-
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lic politics focus at the “improvement of the connection between migrants and Ukrainian go-
vernmental institutions” (Poznjak 2009: 16). They establish “cultural centers” in the immigra-
tion countries and Ukrainian schools for migrants’ children. In regard to my case study I have 
to mention the establishment of the so-called “German-Ukrainian Forum”, an umbrella orga-
nization which carries a symbolic connection between Ukrainian citizens living in Germany 
and Ukrainian government authorities . I also stress the role of the Greek-Catholic church, 
which promotes diasporic connections between the Ukraine and the target regions of migran-
tion since 1947 . To conclude, ‘diasporic’ emigration politics of the Ukrainian government 
promote the self-ethnicization of the ‘Ukrainian’ migrant population. Similar effects are also 
created by domestic ethnicization strategies within the new Ukraine (Mos’ondz 2005, Purigi-
na and Sardak 2007). 
(ad 2) The ‘diasporic’ nature of immigration politics is to some degree interconnected to new 
strategies of self-ethnicization, which have arisen within the young Ukrainian state. After the 
breakdown of the Soviet Union the public discourse on a ‘Ukrainian identity’ has been 
established, because the new state was in need of a homogenized ‘container’ identity. In this 
regard the re-invention of the Ukrainian history was initiated by political and public authorities 
(Davisha and Parot 1997, Gnatyuk 2005, Wilson 2000). Without going into detail, I assume 
that current debates about the “Ukrainian identity”, but also institutional changes such as the 
“Ukrainization” of school and secondary education contents, also influence ways in which 
transnational migrants deal with the ethnicization they experience. “To be proud of who you 
are”, “to understand what it means to be Ukrainian” (interview no. 18 and 19) are important 
narratives for self-ethnicization. On the one hand, these narratives condition migrants’ ways 
of dealing with outside-ethnicization: they enable migrants to overcome discriminatory ef-
fects. On the other hand, they influence the resistance of migrants’ self-ethnicization on the 
long term. To conclude, the deeper understanding of the self- and outside categorizations of 
migrants is only possible if we recognize the modes of ethnicization in both, the country of 
origin and the country of destination. 
(ad 3) In respect to support strategies, I have to highlight some characteristics of the Ukraini-
an welfare regime (Gura 2008). Generally one can assume that the ‘Ukrainian’ welfare sys-
tem declasses parts of the Ukrainian population, because it supports the downward social 
mobility of the elder population. Formally it provides compulsory health insurance, 
unemployment benefit, pension, and child benefits. Though health insurance covers for the 
basic treatments, there are still informal payments required by the physicians. The problema-
tic quality of health care and high costs in case of illness is an additional problem in regard to 
social security . Other benefits like old aged pension, unemployment or child benefits are, 
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according to my interviewees, too small for being regarded as benefits . This frame influen-
ces the socio-economic situation of migrants’ relatives and strongly conditions support stra-
tegies of migrants. The gap between the Ukrainian and German welfare systems is large 
enough to produce specific expectations concerning migrants’ upward class mobility in Ger-
many. On the one hand, relatives can expect that the children’s entry into Germany enables 
them, the children, to access the German welfare systems. This is why relatives accept soci-
al support from them. On the other hand, migrants do not intend to disclose the actual diffi-
culty to get access to welfare, because it would declass them in the eyes of their relatives. 
This situation additionally produces consolidated support of co-migrants, who are not forced 
to explain the mechanisms of declassing to each other (see section V).  
(ad 4) How can we characterize the gender regime which dominates the Ukrainian middle 
class? This regime is strongly influenced by the Soviet ideology of gender equality, which 
has been widely spread in the Ukraine since this region was a part of the Soviet Union 
(Dudwick at al. 2002) . Its central principle refers to the idea that both genders have to be 
equally engaged in the productive labor. The structure of the labor market and of childcare 
facilities as well as the configuration of the welfare system of the Soviet Union was organized 
in accordance with this principle. State facilities were responsible for the reproductive sector. 
However, today this order is under transformation and new paths of division between produc-
tive and reproductive fields are generated. On the one hand, the contemporary ‘Ukrainian’ 
gender order still presupposes that both genders are employed in the productive sector, on 
the other hand, the expectations concerning social mobility vary depending on gender. While 
middle class men have to be successful within the productive sector, the expectations regar-
ding professional success and social mobility of middle class women, who also have to be 
employed, are lower. In this regard university studies of women are seen as an investment in 
their chances on the ‘marriage market’. 
Another point that should be mentioned refers to situations in which the takeover of ‘male’ 
action patterns by women is accepted. In those cases in which “husbands are not able to 
satisfy family’s needs” (Interview no. 34), women are allowed to adopt the role of “breadwin-
ner” and to focus their professional activities on the achievement of professional success. 
This takeover is, accordingly to my interview partner (see Interview no. 31, 33, 34, 35, 36, 38, 
39) especially spread within the female population which is moving from the Ukraine to Rus-
sia, Italy, and Portugal. On the one hand, fellow women describe these women as “poor wo-
men in need who are forced to earn their money abroad because of incapable husbands” 
(see interview no.34). On the other hand, they are perceived as “autonomous women, who 
are able to control their own lives and the lives of their families” (Interview Nr. 36). In regard 
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to my case study the takeover of ‘male’ orientations regarding social success is especially 
accepted in the case of single mothers, who do not have to follow their husband’s expectati-
ons (see Section IV). 
To conclude, the roots of social mobility are engendered. Social mobility of men is generally 
accepted, while social mobility of women is tolerated in specific cases. Consequently, this 
gender order influences the potential declassing of women. As announced above this gender 
order influences modes of social mobility of ‘Ukrainian’ migrants in Germany and migrants’ 
strategies of social support considerable. 
(ad 5) Finally, I explore some aspects of the Ukrainian education system in order to shed 
light on the connection between the educational background of Ukrainian students and their 
migration decisions. The structure of secondary and tertiary education has been under trans-
formation since 1992. On the one hand, the high number of private universities increased. 
On the other, the education contents increasingly include professional knowledge required by 
western companies which have recently located to the Ukraine. Besides of that, a large 
number of school leavers, who prefer to study International Economy, focuses on professio-
nal career in West European companies. The orientation towards competitiveness makes 
earning international university degrees desirable. Consequently, some qualified young peo-
ple prefer to study in Western Europe or in the U.S.A. in order to improve their cultural capital 
for the domestic labor market. To conclude, the earning of ‘western’ education degree is per-
ceived as one possibility to improve the class mobility. But, as mentioned above, the reasons 
for an earning of a ‘western’ degree differ in respect to gender. This fact potentially facilitates 
women’s declassing. 
Table 8: Social categorizations produced by Ukrainian institutions and their inequality 
effects in respect to the group of Ukrainian migrants (Source: own research 
2008/2009) 
Institutional frames of the 
Ukraine 
Inequality effects Effects on migrants’ 
strategies 
Emigration regime 
 
 
Transnationalization of wel-
fare: different agreements 
Positive ethnicization 
 
 
Government’s intention 
to avoid downward mo-
bility caused by illegal 
employment 
 
 
Continuous self-
ethnicization of both, 
men and women 
- 
 
Welfare regime 
(enables migration of middle-
Potential declassing of 
migrants’ relatives 
Different forms of social 
support of relatives by 
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aged women ) migrants 
 
Gender order Engendering of paths of 
social mobility: potential 
slowing of upward mobil-
ity of women, 
The takeover of ‘male’ 
upward mobility patterns 
is possible under specific 
circumstances  
Expectations regarding 
social mobility of married 
women are not very high 
Education system: orientation 
on western degrees 
Merging of expectations 
concerning social mobil-
ity and geographic mobil-
ity 
Studying abroad as a 
strategy to increase so-
cial mobility generally 
reserved for male and 
rarely for female mi-
grants  
 
The overview about different inequality effects produced by German and Ukrainian institu-
tions highlights complex frames which condition migrants’ strategies of social support. How-
ever, my analysis does not only intend to describe different institutional frames in two nation 
states, but also to point out in which situations and under which circumstances these frames 
overlap and produce cumulating effects in regard to unequal social positions of Ukrainian 
migrants living in Germany. 
The overview demonstrates general ways in which the overlapping of institutional frames 
located in both countries, Germany and the Ukraine, intensifies inequality effects. Firstly, 
German immigration regulations and Ukrainian emigration politics produce double ethniciza-
tion effects. Secondly, the Ukrainian welfare system tends to declass migrants’ relatives on 
the one hand, while the selective provision of access to the German welfare system pro-
motes the downward mobility of ‘Ukrainian’ migrants on the other. Different modes of de-
classing of both groups determine paths and amounts of transnational social support. And, 
third, different gender orders in both states simultaneously determine underprivileged social 
mobility of female migrants. 
Table 9: Overlapping of institutional inequality effects in respect to the support 
strategies of ‘Ukrainian’ migrants (Source: own research 2008/2009) 
Inequality effects produced 
by institutional frames in 
Germany 
Inequality effects pro-
duced by institutional 
frames in the Ukraine 
Effects on migrants’ 
strategies 
Ethnicization, declassing, and 
engendering (immigration 
regime, integration regula-
tions) 
 
Positive ethnicization 
(emigration regime) 
 
 
 
Continuous self-
ethnicization of both men 
and women 
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Declassing (welfare regime) Potential declassing of 
migrants’ relatives (wel-
fare regime) 
Different forms of social 
support of relatives by 
migrants 
 
Engendering and declassing 
(gender order) 
Engendering of paths of 
social mobility (gender 
order)  
Expectations regarding 
social mobility of married 
females are not too/very 
high 
Ethnicization and declassing 
(regulations concerning de-
gree recognition) 
Merging of expectations 
concerning social mobil-
ity and geographic mobil-
ity 
Studying abroad as a 
strategy to increase so-
cial mobility generally 
reserved for male and 
exceptionally/rarely for 
female migrants  
 
Résumé 
Migration theories, whose frame of reference is a single nation state (Alba and Nee 2003, 
Esser 1980, Gordon 1964), presuppose a static view on the interconnection between social 
inequality and migration. Declassing of migrants is either described as shifted by migrant 
populations, which are not willing to integrate, or by institutions of the destination state, which 
tend to exclude minorities. The transformation paths of migrants’ class positions and dynam-
ics of ethnicization and engendering, which are simultaneously produced by collective and 
institutional practices in both, the country of origin and in the country of destination, are usu-
ally disregarded in this regard. 
The presented contribution tries to avoid a static perspective on inequality effects of migra-
tion. Instead it combines the intersectionality approach with a transnational lens in order to 
describe complex inequality effects due to migration. What can we learn about inequality 
reproduction due to migration if we use the transnational perspective?  
The central point refers to the significance of the dialectical relationship between two socio-
spatial levels on which migration conditions inequality formation: a) the level of nation states 
and b) the transnational level, which is defined as a pluri-locally organized socio-spatial field 
consisting of dense social relationships (Faist 2000, Pries 2008, Weiß and Berger 2008). On 
the first socio-spatial level or scale we can describe transformations of social positions of 
migrants, their strategies of social mobility, and conditions of access to different institutional 
spheres, either in the country of origin or in the country of destination. On the transnational 
level or scale, we can analyze a contradictive social mobility of migrants, who simultaneously 
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experience downward mobility in the country of destination and upward mobility in the coun-
try of origin. We can also pay attention to overlappings of institutional frames of different na-
tion states, whose categorizations cause cumulative effects in regard to upward or downward 
positioning of migrants. I argue that a transnational perspective on social inequality in relation 
to migration gives us the possibility to conduct an analysis on two different socio-spatial 
scales simultaneously – on the national and on the transnational scale – and to demonstrate, 
how both scales are interconnected . 
The presented case study on the circulation of migrants’ social support within the ‘German’-
‘Ukrainian’ transnational space has taken exactly this perspective. It has provided evidence 
for ways in which inequality effects of migration are mutually constitutive on the national and 
transnational scale. This is why, I highlight, on the one hand, different nation based narra-
tives and institutional conditions which determine social positions of migrants within the 
frame of the German and of the Ukrainian nation state. On the other hand, I also demon-
strate how these inequality effects of social support are embedded in the transnational frame 
of reference. Therefore, I describe the constitution of transnational forms of social inequality 
due to migration, which are expressed in migrants’ experiences of contradictive class mobility 
and of complex representation strategies of class position. I show that the ‘Ukrainian’ narra-
tive of upward mobility due to migration is differs in regard to gender. While both genders are 
expected to be successful in the country of destination, women have to provide more finan-
cial and other kinds of support for their parents and relatives than men. At the same time the 
downward mobility of female and male migrants without a German university degree influ-
ences the larger amount of social support these groups provide to their families than male 
migrants with university degrees. In this regard social support can be regarded as a symbolic 
representation of (an imaginary) upward mobility of migrants. The lower their social position 
in the country of destination, the more social help they seem to provide. At the same time the 
financial and time investments in representation strategies influence the degree of migrants’ 
incorporation in societal institutions in the country of destination. There is a danger that the 
pressure to provide financial support to the home country results in the continuous employ-
ment of women in the informal labor market. In this regard I demonstrate that dealing with the 
contradictive social status leads, especially on the side of women, to the phenomenon of 
self-exploitation. 
In the last section I also highlight ways in which the institutional frames of two different nation 
states produce various inequality effects in regard to ethnicity, class, and gender. My analy-
sis points out how complex categorizations of ‘German’ and ‘Ukrainian’ institutional frames 
overlap and intensify inequality effects on the transnational scale. In this regard I describe 
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categorization practices of migration regimes and welfare systems of both countries, which 
tend to ethnicize and declass both, male and female migrants in different ways. In this regard 
the positive self-ethnicization of migrants is as a form of dealing with the declassing in the 
country of destination. The positive self-ethnicization signifies a symbolic revaluation of one’s 
position, but in fact has ambivalent effects. 
At the same time, I pay attention to the intersection of two different gender orders, which 
strongly influence the dynamics of ethnicization and declassing and slow down the upward 
class mobility of female migrants in the country of destination. These institutional effects are 
additionally strengthened by selected support strategy of co-migrants, such as provision of 
job information. While male migrants, who are included within the first labor market, provide 
information about possible job positions to their male counterparts, female migrants, who are 
to a higher degree than men included within the informal labor market, provide information 
about job positions to their female counterparts. The provision of job information follows a 
specific cultural narrative about women’s places within the productive and reproductive field. 
Exactly this narrative produces additional engendering and potential exclusion of female mi-
grants from the first labor market.  
To conclude, the transnational view on transformation of social inequality due to migration 
discloses complex revaluation practices of social positions of migrants, which take place on 
two socio-spatial scales simultaneously. It shows the dynamic and non-homogeneous quality 
of migrants’ social positions within the ‘German’-‘Ukrainian’ transnational space. It highlights 
the specific forms and mechanisms of inequality formation, such as contradictive class mobil-
ity, complex representation strategies of status transformation, self-exploitation and self-
ethnicization. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Working Papers – Centre on Migration, Citizenship and Development 
 36 
 
 
Appendix: Dates of Interviews 
Interviews with ‘Ukrainian’ migrants, which are conducted in Bielefeld: 
Interview No. 1, O.M., (02.10.2008) 
Interview No. 2, O.K. (20.12.2008) 
Interview No. 3, I.M. (5.10.2008) 
Interview No. 4, T. S. (5.12.2008) 
Interview No. 5, V.N. (20.11.2008) 
Interview No. 6, K.K. (20.10.2008) 
Interview No. 7, O.K. (3.10.2008) 
Interview No. 8, E.L. (15.01.2009) 
Interview No. 9, J.N. (02.02.2009) 
Interview No. 10, O.N. (12.02.2009) 
Interview No. 11, V.N (10.10.2008) 
Interview No. 12, T.S. (12.02.2009) 
Interview No. 13, S.N. (12.02.2009) 
Interview No. 14, L.B. (01.10.2008) 
Interview No. 15, N.K. (13.12.2008) 
Interview No. 16, O.K. (13.02.2009) 
Interview No. 17, O.K. (21.12.2008) 
Interview No. 18, A.K. (11.11.2008) 
Interview No. 19, M.M (24.10.2008) 
Interview No. 20, A.C. (12.12.2008) 
Interview No. 21, I.N. (20.11.2008) 
Interview No. 22, I.S. (10.12.2008) 
Interview No. 23, T.N. (21.04.2009) 
Interview No. 24, S.I. (24.11.2008) 
Interview No. 25, A.H. (12.10.2008) 
Interview No. 26, A.K. (12.12.2008) 
Interview No. 27, V.N. (24.04.2009) 
Interview No. 28, M.V. (01.10.2008) 
Interview No. 29, R.D. (12.02.2009) 
Interview No. 30, I.N. (15.10.2008) 
 
 
Interviews with migrants’ relatives (who are living in the Ukraine), which are conducted in 
Bielefeld: 
Interview No. 31, N.K. (10.01.2009), place of residence: Poltava 
Interview No. 32, N.H. (20.12.2008), place of residence: Kherson 
Interview No. 33, N.L. (13.01.2009), place of residence: Lviv 
 
Interviews with migrants’ relatives, which are conducted in the Ukraine: 
Interview No. 34, O.M. (02.04.2009 - 3.04.2009), Ivano-Frankovsk 
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Interview No. 35, V.K. (04.04.2009), Rogosin by Lviv, 
Interview No. 36, V.K. (06.04.2009-07.04.2009), Poltava 
Interview No. 37, K.P. (8.04.2009), Kyiv 
Interview No. 38, N.B. (9.04.2009), Kyiv 
 
Interviews with experts in the Ukraine: 
Interview No. 39, Alexandr Poznjak (10.04.2009), Kyiv. The head of department of migration research 
at the Institute of Demography and Socioeconomic Research at the National Academy of Ukraine 
Interview No. 40, Lidija Tkatschenko (10.04.2009), Kyiv. The researcher at the Institute of Demogra-
phy and Socioeconomic Research at the National Academy of Ukraine 
 
Interview with experts in Germany: 
Interview No.41, Andreas Turow (07.06.2009), The head of the Foreign Office of Bielefeld City 
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